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Abstract 
Many of the mathematical frameworks describing natural selection are equivalent to Bayes’ 
Theorem, also known as Bayesian updating. By definition, a process of Bayesian Inference is 
one which involves a Bayesian update, so we may conclude that these frameworks describe 
natural selection as a process of Bayesian inference. Thus natural selection serves as a counter 
example to a widely-held interpretation that restricts Bayesian Inference to human mental 
processes (including the endeavors of statisticians). As Bayesian inference can always be cast in 
terms of (variational) free energy minimization, natural selection can be viewed as comprising 
two components: a generative model of an ‘experiment’ in the external world environment, and 
the results of that 'experiment' or the 'surprise' entailed by predicted and actual outcomes of the 
‘experiment’. Minimization of free energy implies that the implicit measure of 'surprise' 
experienced serves to update the generative model in a Bayesian manner. This description 
closely accords with the mechanisms of generalized Darwinian process proposed both by 
Dawkins, in terms of replicators and vehicles, and Campbell, in terms of inferential systems. 
Bayesian inference is an algorithm for the accumulation of evidence-based knowledge. This 
algorithm is now seen to operate over a wide range of evolutionary processes, including natural 
selection, the evolution of mental models and cultural evolutionary processes, notably including 
science itself. The variational principle of free energy minimization may thus serve as a unifying 
mathematical framework for universal Darwinism, the study of evolutionary processes operating 
throughout nature. 
Introduction 
Although Darwin must be counted amongst history’s greatest scientific geniuses, he had very 
little talent for mathematics. His theory of natural selection was presented in remarkable detail, 
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with many compelling examples but without a formal or mathematical framework [1]. Darwin 
did not think in mathematical terms; he found mathematics repugnant and it comprised only a 
small part of his Cambridge education [2]. 
Generally, mathematics is an aid to scientific theories because a theory whose basics are 
described through mathematical relationships can be expanded into a larger network of 
predictive implications and the entirety of the expanded theory subjected to the test of evidence. 
As a bonus, any interpretation of the theory must also conform to this larger network of 
implications to ensure some consistency. 
Natural selection describes the change in frequency or probability of biological traits over 
succeeding generations. One might suppose that a mathematical description – complete with an 
insightful interpretation – would be straightforward, but even today this remains elusive. The 
current impasse involves conceptual difficulties arising from one of mathematics’ bitterest 
interpretational controversies. 
That controversy is between the Bayesian and Frequentist interpretations of probability theory. 
Frequentists assume probability or frequency to be a natural propensity of nature. For instance, 
the fact that each face of a dice will land with 1/6 probability is understood by frequentists to be 
a physical property of the dice. On the other hand, Bayesians understand that humans assign 
probabilities to hypotheses on the basis of the knowledge they have (and the hypotheses they can 
entertain); thus the probability of each side of a dice is 1/6 because the observer has no 
knowledge that would favor one face over the other; the only way that no face is favored is for 
each hypothesis to be assigned the same probability. Furthermore, the value 1/6 is conditioned 
upon the assumption that there are only six possible outcomes. This means that probabilities are 
an attribute of a hypothesis or model space – not of the world that is modeled. 
The Bayesian framework is arguably more comprehensive and has been developed into the 
mathematics of Bayesian inference, at the heart of which is Bayes’ theorem, which describes 
how probabilistic models gain knowledge and learn from evidence. In my opinion, the major 
drawback of the Bayesian approach is an anthropomorphic reliance on human agency, the 
assumption that inference is an algorithm performed only by humans that possess (probabilistic) 
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beliefs. Despite this interpretational dispute there has been some progress in uniting Bayesian 
and frequentist mathematics [3]. 
Despite the lack of mathematics in Darwin’s initial formulation it was not long before 
researchers began developing a mathematical framework describing natural selection. It is an 
historical curiosity that most of these frameworks involved Bayesian mathematics, yet no 
interpretations were offered, proposing natural selection as a process of Bayesian inference.  
The first step in developing this mathematics was taken during Darwin’s lifetime by his cousin, 
Francis Galton. Galton developed numerous probabilistic techniques for describing the variance 
in natural traits – as well as for natural selection in general. His conception of natural selection 
was intriguingly Bayesian; although he may never have heard of Bayes' theorem. Evidence of his 
Bayesian bent is provided by a visual aid that he built for a lecture on heredity and natural 
selection given to the Royal Society [4].  
 
Figure 1: A device constructed by Francis Galton as an aide in an 1877 talk he gave to the Royal Society. It is meant 
to illustrate generational change in the distribution of a population’s characteristics due to natural selection. 
He used this device (see figure 1 below) to explain natural selection in probabilistic terms. It 
contains three compartments: a top compartment representing the frequency of traits in the 
parent population, a middle one representing the application of 'relative fitness' to the child 
generation and a third representing the normalization of the resulting distribution in the child 
generation. Beads are loaded in the top compartment to represent the distribution in the parent 
generation and then are allowed to fall into the second compartment. The trick is in the second 
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compartment, which contains a vertical division, in the shape of the relative fitness distribution. 
Some of the beads fall behind this division and are ‘wasted’; they do not survive and are 
removed from sight. The remaining beads represent the distribution of the 'survivors' in the child 
generation. 
 
Galton’s device has recently been rediscovered and employed by Stephan Stigler and others in 
the statistics community as a visual aid, not for natural selection, but for Bayes' theorem. The 
top compartment represents the prior distribution, the middle one represents the application of 
the likelihood to the prior, and the third represents the normalization of the resulting distribution. 
The change between the initial distribution and the final one is the Bayesian update. 
R.A. Fisher further developed the mathematics describing natural selection during the 1920s and 
1930s. He applied statistical methods to the analysis of natural selection via Mendelian genetics 
and arrived at the fundamental theorem of natural selection which states [5]: 
The rate of increase in fitness of any organism at any time is equal to its genetic variance 
in fitness at that time. 
Although Fisher was a fierce critic of the Bayesian interpretation (which he considered 
subjective) he pioneered – and made many advances with – the frequentist interpretation.  
The next major development in the mathematics of natural selection came in 1970 with the 
publication of the Price equation, which built on the fundamental theorem of natural selection [6, 
7]. Although the Price equation fully describes evolutionary change, its meaning has only 
recently begun to be unraveled, notably by Steven A. Frank in a series of papers spanning the 
last couple of decades. Frank’s insights into the meaning of the Price equation culminated in a 
2012 paper [8] which derives a description of natural selection using the mathematics of 
information theory. 
In my opinion, this paper represents a significant advance in the understanding of evolutionary 
change as it shifts the interpretation from the objective statistical description of frequentist 
probability to an interpretation in terms of Bayesian inference. Unfortunately, Frank does not 
share my appreciation of his accomplishment. While he understands that his mathematics are 
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very close to those of Bayesian inference he does not endorse a Bayesian interpretation but 
prefers an interpretation in terms of information theory. 
Information and Bayesian inference 
However, the mathematics of information theory and Bayesian probability are joined at the hip, 
as their basic definitions are in terms of one another. Information theory begins with a definition 
of information in terms of probability: 
𝐼(ℎ𝑖|m) = −𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃(ℎ𝑖|m)) 
Here, we may view hi  as the i
th hypothesis or event in a mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
family of n competing hypotheses comprising a model m. 𝐼(ℎ𝑖|m) is the information gained, 
under the model, on learning that hypothesis hi is true. 𝑃(ℎ𝑖|m) is the probability that had 
previously been assigned by the model that the hypothesis hi is true. Thus information is 
‘surprise’; the less likely a model initially considers a hypothesis that turns out to be the case, the 
more surprise it experiences, and thus the more information it receives. 
Information theory, starting with the very definition of information, is aligned with the Bayesian 
interpretation of probability; information is ‘surprise’ or the gap between an existing state of 
knowledge and a new state of knowledge gained through receiving new information or evidence. 
The model itself, composed of the distribution of the p(hi), may also be said to have an 
expectation. The information which the model ‘expects’' is the weighted average of the 
information expected by the n individual p(hi), which is called the model’s entropy.  
𝑆(𝐻|𝑚) =  ∑  𝑝(ℎ𝑖|m) (−log (𝑝(ℎ𝑖|m))
𝑛
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Entropy is the amount of information that separates a model’s current state of knowledge from 
certainty. 
Bayes' theorem follows directly from the axioms of probability theory and may be understood as 
the implication that new evidence or information holds for the model described by the 
distribution of the p(hi). This theorem states that on the reception of new information (I) by the 
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model (m) the probability of each component hypothesis (hi) making up the model updates 
according to: 
P(hi|I, m) = P(hi|m)
P(I|him)
P(I|m)
 
Bayesian inference is commonly understood as any process which employs Bayes’ theorem to 
accumulate evidence based knowledge [9]: the quantity P(I|m) is called (Bayesian) model 
evidence and corresponds to the probability of observing some new information, under a 
particular model, averaged over all hypotheses. This is a crucial quantity in practice and can be 
used to adjudicate between good and bad models in statistical analysis. It is also the quantity 
approximated by (variational) free energy – as we will see below. Effectively, this equation 
provides the formal basis for Bayesian belief updating: in which prior beliefs about the 
hypotheses P(hi|m) are transformed into posterior beliefs P(hi|I, m), which are informed by new 
information. This updating rests upon the likelihood model; namely the likelihood of observing 
new information given the i-th hypothesis P(I|him). This formalism highlights the information 
theoretic nature of Bayesian updating – and the key role of a (likelihood) model in accumulating 
evidence. 
We may conclude from this short overview of the relationship between information and 
Bayesian inference that information has little meaning outside a Bayesian context. Information 
depends upon a model that assigns probabilities to outcomes and which is updated on the 
reception of new information. In short, there is no information unless there is something that can 
be informed. This something is a model. 
Thus we see that, contrary to Frank’s view, Bayesian inference and information theory have the 
same logical structure. However, it is instructive to follow Frank’s development of the 
mathematics of evolutionary change in terms of information theory, while keeping in mind his 
denial of its relationship to Bayesian inference. Frank begins his unpacking of the Price equation 
by describing the ‘simple model’ he will develop:  
A simple model starts with n different types of individuals. The frequency of each type is 
qi. Each type has wi offspring, where w expresses fitness. In the simplest case, each type 
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is a clone producing wi copies of itself in each round of reproduction. The frequency of 
each type after selection is 
 𝑞𝑖
, =  𝑞𝑖 
𝑤𝑖
w
   (1) 
   Where 𝑤 =  ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
1 𝑤𝑖 is the average fitness of the trait in the population. The 
summation is over all of the n different types indexed by the i subscripts.  
Equation (1) is clearly an instance of Bayes’ theorem, where the new evidence or information is 
given in terms of relative fitness and thus Frank’s development of this simple model is in terms 
of Bayesian inference.  
While Frank acknowledges an isomorphism between Bayes’ theorem and his simple model, he 
does not find this useful and prefers to describe the relationship as an analogy. He makes the 
somewhat dismissive remark: 
I am sure this Bayesian analogy has been noted many times. But it has never developed 
into a coherent framework that has contributed significantly to understanding selection. 
On the contrary, I would suggest that Frank’s paper itself develops a coherent framework for 
natural selection in terms of Bayesian inference. In particular, he highlights the formal 
relationships between the Price equation (or replicator equation) and Bayesian belief updating 
(e.g. Kalman Filtering). This is potentially interesting because many results in evolutionary 
theory can now be mapped to standard results in statistics, machine learning and control theory. 
Although we will not go into technical details, a nice example here is that Fisher’s fundamental 
theorem corresponds to the increase in Kalman gain induced by random fluctuations (this 
variational principle is well-known in control theory and volatility theory in economics). Despite 
this, Frank dismisses Bayesian formulations because they do not appear to bring much to the 
table. This is understandable in the sense that the mathematics traditionally used to describe 
natural selection already has a Bayesian form and merely acknowledging this fact does not lead 
to a new formalism. However, this conclusion might change dramatically if biological evolution 
was itself a special case of a Universal Darwinism that was inherently Bayesian in its nature. In 
what follows, we pursue this line of argument by appealing to the variational principle of least 
free energy. 
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Free energy minimization principle  
Baez and Pollard have recently demonstrated the similarities of a number of information-
theoretic formulations, including the Bayesian replicator equation, evolutionary game theory, 
Markov processes and chemical reaction networks, that are applicable to biological systems as 
they approach equilibrium [10]. In general, any process of Bayesian inference may be cast in 
terms of (variational) free energy minimization [11, 12] and – in this form – some important 
interpretative issues gain clarity. This approach has been used by Hinton, Friston and others to 
describe the evolution of mental states as well as to describe pattern formation and general 
evolutionary processes. In its most general form, the free energy principle suggests that any 
weakly-mixing ergodic random dynamical system must be describable in terms of Bayesian 
inference. This means that the equivalence between classical formulations of evolution and 
Bayesian updating are both emergent properties of any random dynamical system that sustains 
measurable characteristics over time (i.e. is ergodic) [13]. This is quite important because it 
means that evolution is itself an emergent property of any such systems. Although conceptually 
intriguing, there may be other advantages to treating evolution in terms of minimizing variational 
free energy. In what follows, I will try to demonstrate this may be true. 
In 1970 Ashby and Conant [14] proved a theorem that any regulating mechanism for a complex 
system that is both successful and simple must be isomorphic with the system being regulated. In 
other words, it must contain a model of the system being regulated. As no model can be exactly 
isomorphic to its subject without being a clone and therefore exactly as complex as its subject, 
this theorem suggests a variational approach may be useful, one which optimizes the difference 
between the accuracy and the complexity of the model. 
This is exactly a form in which the free energy minimization principle may be cast [15]: 
𝐹(𝑠, 𝑢) =  𝐷𝐾𝐿[𝑞(𝜓|𝜇)||𝑝(𝜓|𝑚)] − 𝐸𝑞[log 𝑝(𝑠|𝜓, 𝑚)] 
  Free Energy  = Complexity - Accuracy 
Where 𝜓 are hidden states of the world or environment, s are their sensory consequences or 
samples (that can depend upon action), 𝜇 are internal states and 𝑚 is the generative model. The 
distribution q is the current predictions of the states of the environment, the 
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distribution p is the true states of the environment and the KL divergence is a measure 
of the distance between them. Crucially, free energy can also be expressed in terms of the 
surprise of sampled consequences: 
𝐹(𝑠, 𝑢) =  𝐷𝐾𝐿[𝑞(𝜓|𝜇)||𝑝(𝜓|𝑠, 𝑚)] − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝(𝑠|𝑚) 
  Free Energy  = relative entropy + surprise 
This formulation of evolutionary change may appear quite different from that of Bayesian 
inference as it has a focus on model quality rather than fitness. However, a sustained decrease in 
free energy (or increase in log model evidence) is equivalent to a decrease in model entropy and 
therefore contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of the second law. The letter of that law allows a 
decrease in entropy for dynamic systems only if an environmental swap is conducted where low 
entropy inputs are exchanged for high entropy outputs. In short, the second law forbids the 
existence or survival of low entropy dynamic systems lacking such an ability – an ability that 
mandates a model of the environment and Bayesian inference under that model. This provides a 
focus for the model’s knowledge accumulation; it must entail knowledge of its environment as 
well as a strategy to perform the required entropy swaps within that environment. Thus the drive 
to fitness, which is explicit in the Bayesian formulation, is also implicit in the free energy 
formulation. 
As descriptions of evolutionary processes in terms of free energy minimization have great 
general applicability it may be useful to consider some specific examples. In biological evolution 
we can associate the model (𝑚) with a genotype. This means the genotype corresponds to the 
sufficient statistics of the prior beliefs a phenotype is equipped with on entering the world. 
Keeping in mind that organisms may sense their environments through both chemical and neural 
means, we may associate sensory exchanges with the environment (s) with adaptive states. 
Finally, the sufficient statistics of the posterior (𝑚𝜇) can be associated with a phenotype. In other 
words, the phenotype embodies probabilistic beliefs about states of its external milieu. This 
formulation tells us several fundamental things: 
 i) everything that can change will change to minimize free energy. Here, the only things that can 
change are the sufficient statistics; namely, the genotype and phenotype. This means there are 
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two optimizations in play: adaptive changes in the phenotype over somatic time (i.e. changes in 
𝑚𝜇) and adaptive changes in the genotype over evolutionary time (i.e. changes in 𝑚). 
 ii) somatic changes will be subject to two forces: first, a maximization of accuracy that simply 
maximizes the probability of occupying adaptive states, and second, a minimization of 
complexity. This minimization corresponds to reducing the divergence between the beliefs 
about, or model of, (hidden) environmental states (𝜓) implicit in the phenotype and the prior 
beliefs implicit in the genotype. In other words, a good genotype will enable the minimization of 
free energy by equipping the phenotype with prior beliefs that are sufficient to maintain accuracy 
or a higher probability of adaptive states. Thus the phenotype may be thought of as a type of 
experiment, which gathers evidence to test prior beliefs; i.e., gathers evidence for its own 
existence. 
iii) changes in the genotype correspond to Bayesian model selection (c.f., natural selection). This 
simply means selecting models or genotypes that have a low free energy or high Bayesian model 
evidence. Because the Bayesian model evidence is the probability of an adaptive state given a 
model or genotype (𝑝(𝑠|𝑚)), natural selection’s negative variational free energy becomes (free) 
fitness. At this level of free energy minimization, evolution is in the game of orchestrating 
multiple (phenotypic) experiments to optimize models of the (local) environment. 
Another specific example of the general ability of the free energy minimization principle to 
describe evolutionary change is in neuroscience where it is fairly easy to demonstrate the 
centrality of this principle in explaining evolutionary, developmental and perceptual processes in 
a wide range of mental functions [11]. The brain produces mental models which combine 
sensory information concerning the state of the environment, with possible actions with which 
the organism may intervene. The initiation of an action is a kind of experiment in the outside 
world testing the current beliefs about its hidden states. The overall drive of the free energy 
principle is to reduce the model complexity, while maximizing its accuracy in achieving the 
predicted outcome. Crucially, the ensuing self-organization can be seen at multiple levels of 
organization; from dendritic processes that form part of the single neuron – to entire brains. The 
principles are exactly the same, the only thing that changes is the way that the model is encoded 
(e.g., with intracellular concentrations of various substrates – or neuronal activity and 
connectivity in distributed brain systems). This sort of formulation has also been applied to self-
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organization and pattern formation when multiple systems jointly minimize their free energy (for 
example, in multi-agent games and morphogenesis at the cellular level).  
Clearly, the application of variational (Bayesian) principles to ecological and cellular systems 
means we have to abandon the notion that only humans can make inferences. We will take up 
this theme below and see how freeing oneself from the tyranny of anthropomorphism leads us 
back to a universal Darwinism. 
The free energy minimization principle may also be applied to processes of cultural evolution. A 
compelling example here is the evolution of scientific understanding itself. Science develops 
hypotheses or theoretical models of natural phenomena. These models are used to design 
experiments in the real world and the results of the experiment are used to update the probability 
of each hypothesis composing the model according to Bayes’ theorem. In the process free energy 
is minimized through a balance which reduces the model’s complexity (Occam’s razor) while 
increasing the model’s predictive accuracy and explanatory scope. 
The evolutionary interaction between models and the systems they model, as described by the 
free energy minimization principle, may be applicable to additional natural phenomena beyond 
the examples above. Several attempts have been made to describe universal Darwinism in such 
terms. We have previously noted the wide range of scientific subject matter that has been 
identified within the literature as Darwinian processes – and have offered an interpretation in 
terms of inferential systems [16]; an interpretation closely related to that of the free energy 
minimization principle.  Richard Dawkins offered a description of biological evolution in terms 
of replicators and vehicles [17], a description which Blackmore and Dennett have generalized to 
interpret universal Darwinism [18, 19]. That description may also be understood as an interplay 
between internal models (replicators) and the experience of the ‘experiments’ (vehicles) which 
they model in the external world. 
The Price equation describing evolutionary change may be cast in a form which distinguishes 
between change due to selection and transmission. Changes due to selection tend to decrease 
model variation whereas changes due to transmission or copying of the model serve to increase 
variation. The transmission changes of biological models are often in the form of genetic 
mutations [20]. From the perspective of universal Darwinism, we might expect a mechanism 
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capable of increasing model variation within non-biological evolutionary processes that is 
analogous to biological mutation. As an example we might consider the process of evolutionary 
change in scientific models during transmission. These may appear less clear; there is less 
consensus on how new and sometimes improved scientific models are generated. It may seem 
this process has little in common with the somewhat random and undirected process of biological 
mutation. 
The mental process by which researchers arrives at innovative models is largely hidden and 
might be considered closer to an art form than algorithmic but the development of 
inferential/Darwinian evolutionary computational processes have demonstrated a strong ability 
to discover innovative models in agreement with the evidence [21, 22]. In some instances, these 
evolutionary approaches have inferred successful models for systems which have long eluded 
researchers [23].  
The arena of Bayesian inference 
The reluctance of many researchers to endorse a Bayesian interpretation of evolutionary change 
may be somewhat puzzling. One reason for this is a peculiarity, and I would suggest a flaw, in 
the usual Bayesian interpretation of inference that renders it unfit as a description of generalized 
evolutionary change. The consensus Bayesian position is that probability theory only describes 
inferences made by humans. As E.T. Jaynes put it [24]: 
it is...the job of probability theory to describe human inferences at the level of 
epistemology. 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature and scope of knowledge. Since 
Plato the accepted definition of knowledge within epistemology has been ‘justified true beliefs’ 
held by humans.  In the Bayesian interpretation ‘justified’ means justified by the evidence. ‘True 
belief’ is the degree of belief in a given hypothesis which is justified by the evidence; it is the 
probability that the hypothesis is true within the terms of the model. Thus knowledge is the 
probability, based on the evidence, that a given belief or model is true. I have proposed a 
technical definition of knowledge as 2-S where S is the entropy of the model [16].  
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A perhaps interesting interpretation of this definition is that knowledge occurs within the 
confines of entropy or ignorance. For example, in a model composed of a family of 64 
competing hypotheses, where no evidence is available to decide amongst them, we would assign 
a probability of 1/64 to each hypothesis. The model has an entropy of 6 bits and has knowledge 
of 2-6 = 1/64. Let’s say some evidence becomes available and the model’s entropy or ignorance 
is reduced to 3 bits. Then the knowledge of the updated model is 1/8, equivalent to the entropy of 
a model composed of only 8 competing hypotheses that is maximally ignorant, which has no 
available evidence. The effect which evidence has on the model is to increase its knowledge by 
reducing the scope of its ignorance.  
It is unfortunate that both Bayesian and Frequentist interpretations deny the existence of 
knowledge outside of the human realm because it forbids the application of Bayesian inference 
to phenomena other than models conceived by humans, it denies that knowledge may be 
accumulated in natural processes unconnected to human agency and it acts as a barrier in 
realizing our close relationship to the rest of nature. Thus even though natural selection is clearly 
described in terms of the mathematics of Bayesian inference, neither Bayesians such as Jaynes 
nor frequentists such as Frank can acknowledge this fact due to another hard fact: natural 
selection is not dependent upon human agency. In both their views this may rule out a Bayesian 
interpretation.  
I believe that the correct way out of this conundrum is to simply acknowledge that in many 
cases inference is performed by non-human agents as in the case of natural selection and that 
inference is an algorithm which we share with much of nature. The genome may for instance be 
understood as an example of a non-human conceived model involving families of competing 
hypotheses in the form of competing alleles within the population. Such models are capable of 
accumulating evidence-based knowledge in a Bayesian manner. The evidence involved is simply 
the proportion of traits in ancestral generations which make it into succeeding generations. In 
other words, we just need to broaden Jaynes' definition of probability to include non-human 
agency in order to view natural selection in terms of Bayesian inference. 
In this view the accumulation of knowledge is a preoccupation we share with the rest of nature. It 
allows us to view nature as possessing some characteristics, such as surprise and expectations, 
previously thought by many as unique to humans or at least to animals.  For instance, all 
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organisms ‘expect’ to find themselves in the type of environment for which they have been 
adapted and are ‘surprised’ if they don’t. 
Universal Darwinism 
Bayesian probability, epistemology and science in general tend to draw a false distinction 
between the human and non-human realms of nature. In this view the human realm is replete 
with knowledge and thus infused with meaning, purpose and goals, and Bayesian inference may 
be used to describe its knowledge-accumulating attributes. On the other hand, the non-human 
realm is viewed as devoid of these attributes and thus Bayesian inference is considered 
inapplicable. 
However, if we recognize expanded instances, such as natural selection, in which nature 
accumulates knowledge then we may also recognize that Bayesian inference, as well as 
equivalent mathematical forms, provides a suitable mathematical description in both realms. 
Evolutionary processes, as described by the mathematics of Bayesian inference, are those which 
accumulate knowledge for a specific purpose, knowledge required for increased fitness, for 
increased chances of continued existence. Thus the mathematics implies purpose, meaning and 
goals, and provides legitimacy for Daniel Dennett’s interpretation of natural selection in those 
terms [19]. If we allow an expanded scope for Bayesian inference, we may view Dennett’s poetic 
interpretation of Darwinian processes as having support from its most powerful mathematical 
formulations.  
An important aspect of these mathematics is that they apply not only to natural selection but also 
to any generalized evolutionary processes where inherited traits change in frequencies between 
generations. As noted in a cosmological context by Conlon and Gardner [25]: 
Specifically, Price’s equation of evolutionary genetics has generalized the concept of 
selection acting upon any substrate and, in principle, can be used to formalize the 
selection of universes as readily as the selection of biological organisms. 
At the core of Bayesian inference, underlying both the Price equation and the principle of free 
energy minimization we find an extremely simple mathematical expression: Bayes’ theorem: 
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𝑞𝑖
, =  𝑞𝑖 
𝑤𝑖
w
 
Simply put this equality says that the probabilities assigned to the hypotheses of a probabilistic 
model are updated by new data or experience according to a ratio, that of the probability of 
having the experience given that the specific hypothesis is correct to the average probability 
assigned by the model to having that experience. Those hypotheses supported by the data, those 
that assign greater than average probability to having the actual experience, will be updated to 
greater values and those hypotheses not supported by the data will be updated to lesser values. 
This simple equation describes the accumulation of evidence-based knowledge concerning 
fitness. 
When Bayes’ theorem is used to describe an evolutionary process the ratio involved is one of 
relative fitness, the ratio of the fitness of a specific form of a trait to the average fitness of all 
forms of that trait. It is thus extremely general in describing any entity able to increase its 
chances of survival or to increase its adaptiveness. When cast in terms of the principle of free 
energy minimization some further implications of this simple equation are revealed (see above).  
In a biological evolutionary context, the Price equation is traditionally understood as the 
mathematics of evolutionary change. However, the Price equation may be derived from a form of 
Bayes’ theorem [26, 8, 27] which means it describes a process of Bayesian inference, a very 
general form of Bayesian inference which according to Gardner [26] applies to any group of 
entities that undergo transformations in terms of a change in probabilities between generations or 
iterations. Even with this great generality it provides a useful model as it partitions evolutionary 
change in terms of selection and transmission [7]. 
There are numerous examples of these equivalent mathematical forms used in the literature to 
describe evolutionary change across a wide scope of scientific subject matter, specifically 
evolutionary change in biology [8, 26], neuroscience [11, 28] and culture [29, 30, 31, 32].  
It is interesting to speculate on the similarity of these mathematical forms to those which may be 
used to describe quantum physics. Quantum physics is also based upon probabilistic models 
which are updated by information received through interactions with other entities in the world. 
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Wojciech Zurek, the founder of the theory of quantum Darwinism [33], notes that the update of 
quantum states may be understood in terms of ratios acting to update probabilistic models [34]. 
Using this connection, we then infer probabilities of possible outcomes of measurements 
on S from the analogue of the Laplacian ‘ratio of favorable events to the total number of 
equiprobable events’, which we shall see in Section V is a good definition of quantum 
probabilities for events associated with effectively classical records kept in pointer states.  
Unfortunately, many who have attempted to interpret quantum theory in terms of Bayesian 
inference, such as Caves, Fuchs and Schack [35], have endorsed a common anthropomorphic 
Bayesian flaw and conclude that the probabilities involved with quantum phenomena are a 
‘personal judgment’ [36], and thus that the inferences involved take place within a human brain. 
A conceptual shift acknowledging that inference is a natural algorithm which may be performed 
in processes outside of the human brain may go some way to allowing quantum Darwinism to be 
understood as a process of Bayesian inference conducted at the quantum level [37]. 
 
A vast array of phenomena is subject to evolutionary change and describable by the equivalent 
mathematical forms discussed here. These forms interpret evolutionary change as based on the 
accumulation of evidence-based knowledge. Conversely, many instances of evidence-based 
knowledge found in nature are describable using this mathematics. We might speculate that all 
forms of knowledge accumulation found in nature may eventually find accommodation within 
this paradigm. Certainly, the theorem proved by Cox [38] identifies Bayesian inference as the 
unique method by which models may be updated with evidence. 
 
It is somewhat ironic that in 1935 R.A. Fisher wrote [39]: 
Inductive inference is the only process known to us by which essentially new knowledge 
comes into the world. 
Of course he was referring to experimental design and considered it unnecessary to specify that 
he was referring only to human knowledge. Probably he assumed that no other repositories of 
knowledge exist. The stage may now be set for us to understand his assertion as literally true in 
its full generality. 
  
17 
 
Ultimately the scope and interpretation of universal Darwinism, the study of phenomena which 
undergoes evolutionary change, will depend on the mathematical model underlying it. Those 
phenomena which are accurately and economically described by the mathematics must be judged 
to be within the scope of universal Darwinism. Given the great generality and substrate 
independence of current mathematical models, a unification of a wide range of scientific subject 
matters within this single paradigm may be possible.  
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